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After 18 years of negotiations, Russia has joined the World Trade Organization. This paper assesses how the tariff structure of the Russian Federation will change as a result of the phased implementation of its World Trade Organization commitments between 2012 and 2020 and how it has changed as a result of its agreement to participate in a Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. The analysis uses trade data at the ten digit level, which allows the first accurate assessment of the impact of these policy changes. It finds that World Trade Organization commitments will progressively and significantly lower the applied tariffs of the Russian This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group; and the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dtarr@worldbank.org.
Federation. After all commitments are implemented, tariffs will fall from 11.5 percent to 7.9 percent on an un-weighted average basis, or from 13.0 percent to 5.8 percent on a weighted average basis. The average "bound" tariff rate of Russia under its World Trade Organization commitments will be 8.6 percent, that is, 0.7 percentage points higher than the applied tariffs. Russia's commitments represent significant tariff liberalization, but compared with other countries that have acceded to the World Trade Organization, the commitments of the Russian Federation are not unusual, especially when compared with the Transition countries. In this paper we assess how the tariff structure of the Russian Federation has changed or will change as a result of these policy changes--the Customs Union agreement and the sequence of WTO commitments. Given the staged implementation of the WTO tariff commitments, we estimate the projected tariff structure on an annual basis until the year 2020, both in aggregate and at the two digit tariff line level.
Impact of WTO Accession and the Customs Union on
We also compare the bound tariffs of Russia to its applied tariffs and calculate the -water in the tariff‖-that is, by how much will the applied tariffs of Russia be below their bound levels.
Most previous efforts to assess the Russian tariff regime have been hampered by two problems: (1) about fifteen percent of the tariff lines of Russia (and the Customs Union) use a -combined‖ tariff rate system. For these tariff lines, both an ad valorem and specific tariff are indicated, and the actual tariff applied by Russian customs is the maximum of the two. To know the actual tariff, where specific tariffs are specified, we must calculate their ad valorem equivalents. This is a non-trivial task, and some previous efforts have simply ignored the specific tariffs, resulting in an underestimate of the actual tariff rates; 2 and (2) due to the lack of ten digit tariff line data on the value and quantity of imports, most prior calculations were based on more aggregate and less precise data.
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The first study to accurately assess the structure of the Russian tariff structure, using trade and tariff data at the ten digit tariff line level was Shepotylo and Tarr (2008) . They provided calculations for the years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] and showed a trend of increasing protection for light industry and the food industry during this period. Jandosov and Sabyrova (2011) and Shepotylo (2011) In widely cited estimates, the WTO (2011) assessed that the un-weighted average bound tariff of the Russian Federation would be 7.8 percent after all commitments are implemented. The World Trade Organization, however, based its calculations on 8-digit trade data, which introduces imprecision. 5 Our estimate of the un-weighted bound tariff of the Russian Federation after all commitments are implemented is 8.6 percent. But the bound tariffs are only maximum tariffs, as Russia 2 See, for example, ATF Bank (2011) . 3 The previous data available were the annual hard copy reports of the Russian Customs Committee. These reports aggregate information from the tariff line level, so that information is reported on about 1700 aggregated product codes out of about 11,000 tariff lines. Previously, World Bank staff manually entered these data annually in order to perform the calculations that were possible with those data. Earlier work based on these data includes the following. Tarr (1999; has assessed the average level of the Russian tariff and the degree of tariff escalation by stage of production using 1900 tariff lines. Afontsev applied the Grossman-Helpman methodology to the Russian tariff structure in two papers. Afontsev (2002) assessed to extent to which industrial lobbying, consumer welfare or government revenue can explain the formation of Russian tariff policy in 1992 -1997 . Afontsev (2004 assessed the motivation of the government for the tariff simplification policy of [2000] [2001] . See the chapters and discussions on Russia in Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994; 1996) for other early calculations. 4 The majority of exemptions were eliminated after July 1, 2011. 5 Further, the WTO Secretariat dropped specific tariffs when there was no match at the six digit level between the tariff classification and the trade data, which biases down the estimated tariff. Based on our three year base period (one year more recent than the WTO), we calculate this occurred in the case of 22 tariff lines in the years 2012-2020.
will apply lower tariffs on 1498 tariff lines unless these tariffs are raised. We also assess the impact of WTO accession commitments on the applied tariffs in Russia, and we assess the applied tariffs in each year as Russia progressively implements its WTO commitments.
Our key results are the following. The impact of the Customs Union agreement on the tariffs of the Russian Federation is negligible. On the other hand, the WTO commitments will progressively and significantly lower the applied tariffs of the Russian Federation. In 2011, the average Russian tariff was 11.5 percent on an un-weighted average basis and 13.0 percent on a weighted average basis. By 2020, we calculate that the impact of the WTO commitments will be to reduce the average tariff of the Russian Federation to 7.9 percent on an un-weighted average basis and to about 5.8 percent on a weighted average basis. These estimates show that the tariffs on the more important in value import items will be cut to a larger extent. The sectors whose tariffs are projected to decline the most (on an un-weighted basis) as a result of the WTO commitments are: timber, wood, pulp and paper (6.1 percentage points); light industry (4.1 percentage points); and the food industry (4.6 percentage points).
We find that when all the WTO commitments are implemented, the average bound tariff of the Russian Federation will be 8.6 percent on an un-weighted basis,
i.e., 0.7 percentage points greater than the applied average tariff. This is explained by the fact that there will be 1498 tariff lines with applied tariff rates less than the maximum or bound rates under the WTO commitments. We discuss why this has important implications for facilitating the accession of Kazakhstan into the WTO.
We show that compared with other countries that have acceded to the WTO, the commitments of the Russian Federation are not unusual, especially when compared to the Transition countries. Most Transition countries that have acceded to the WTO have bound their tariffs at levels lower than the final bound commitments of the Russian Federation.
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In section II we discuss the data sources for the analysis. The methodology is elaborated in section III, both intuitively and mathematically. In section IV we discuss the results for the overall averages, while in section V we discuss the results for tariffs at the sector level.
II. Data Sources

Trade Data (Values and Quantities of Imports)
Bilateral data on the quantity and value of Russian imports from all partner countries except Belarus for the years 2001 to 2010 inclusive and for the first half of the year 2011, were acquired from the electronic database of the commercial company Academy-Service. 7 This dataset provides information on the value and quantity of imports at the tariff line level, i.e., the 10-digit level. The quantity data are available in physical units such as kilograms and the value of imports is in US dollars. Since there are more than 11,000 tariff lines and the data are reported by partner country at the tariff line level, the database contains about 450,000 or 500,000 observations per year.
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Tariff Data
The source of the data on the tariff rates of the Russian cm3; and 870324 is for cylinder capacities exceeding 3 000 cm3. Within each six digit category, we take a simple average of the lower and upper bounds as the expected value of the cylinder capacity, i.e., for 870321 we have 500 (0+1000)/2=500). Therefore, the following expected engine volumes apply: 500 cm3 for 870321, 1250 cm3 for 870322, 2250 cm3 for 870323, and 3000 cm3 for 870324. Then we know that all ten digit tariff lines with the same 6 digit code have this engine capacity and we can apply the specific tariff to the numbers of cars in the import data based on the engine capacity that applies to these ten digit tariff lines from the tariff schedule.
Exchange Rates
Specific tariffs are typically specified in euros, but the value of imports are in US dollars. We use the average annual interbank exchange rates to convert euros to US dollars. tariff lines with a potential specific tariff component used a -combined‖ tariff structure. 13 For products with the combined tariff structure, the maximum of the ad valorem or specific tariff is the tariff that applies.
Tariffs for the Years 2001-2010
Define h jt v and h jt q as the value and quantity, respectively, of imports of tariff line h from country j in year t. As mentioned above, we have these data for 2001 through 2010 and the first half of 2011. Since we are interested in the MFN tariff, we exclude imports from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, because CIS imports enter tariff-free for the most part.
14 Suppose further that are ad valorem and specific parts of the tariff applied to the tariff line h at time t, t=2001-2011. 12 Our source for exchange rates is: http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. 13 Footwear is an exception where the sum of the specific and ad valorem tariffs is applied and there are a limited number of tariff lines where only specific tariffs apply. 14 In addition to the CIS agreement and the Customs Union agreement with Kazakhstan and Belarus, Russia has bilateral free trade agreements with most of the CIS countries. Despite these agreements there are exceptions to the principle of tariff free access to the Russian market by CIS exporters, but these exceptions are reportedly not common.
We compute the ad valorem equivalent of the specific part of the tariff according to the following formula:
(1)
Note that the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff varies by country. Since the tariff that is paid is calculated at the transaction level, the precise way to calculate the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff is to make the calculation analogous to the calculation in equation 1 on each transaction and then aggregate. We do not have transaction level data, but on the presumption that firms within a country tend to produce that are more similar to each other than to those of other countries, the calculation should be more precise if we use the country level data. For countries that sell low value products, the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff will be higher.
Wines are an example. Imported French wine into Russia tends to be of higher value than imported wine from countries like Bulgaria. So the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff on French wine will be less than the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff on Bulgarian wine. The Russian authorities are well aware of this impact and use the specific tariff to provide greater protection against the products they believe are competing most closely against Russian products. Equation 1 allows us to use our data on imports by country. average tariff in year t, and TW(t) as the weighted average tariff in year t. 15 We assume there is a recording error in the data if the calculation of the applied MFN rate for a tariff line for a particular country is above 1000 percent; we drop such observations from the calculation. For 2011 this decision rule led to drop of 60 observations out of 1,302,487 matched observations.
We have that the simple or un-weighted average tariff in year t is:
The weighted average tariff is: For tariff lines h in the years 2011-2020 with no match in the base period, we look for a match at the eight-digit level in the base period. If there is no match at the eight-digit level, we look for a match at the six-digit level; in a few cases, we had to find a match at the four digit level. Our calculations, however, are always based on ten-digit data. So if there is a match at the eight-digit level, we use all ten-digit tariff line data corresponding to the eight-digit tariff code in a manner analogous to equations 1 and 2. In general, there will be multiple ten-digit tariff lines corresponding to a single eight-digit tariff line; so we will need to average over multiple ten-digit tariff lines in such cases. Further, we continue to use data at the most disaggregated level available, i.e., the country level. So for any ten-digit tariff line we use the quantity and value of imports from all countries from which Russia had positive imports in all of the three time periods of our base period.
While we hope that the explanation above is clear and intuitive, the remainder of this section is devoted to the mathematical description, and this requires the introduction of considerable notation. The reader who is interested in the results should be able to skip the remainder of this section.
Definition of Matched Tariff Lines
Define A t = the set of all ten digit tariff lines in the Russian tariff code in year states that the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff applied to tariff line h, depends on the country and year of the trade weight. We then aggregate over all years and non-CIS countries to get the MFN tariff for product line h for the year 2011. This is calculated by: Consider a tariff line ' h (from year t') that matches tariff line h (from year t) at the k digit level. Building on equation 5, we will calculate the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff on tariff line h in year t using all tariff lines ' h and non-CIS countries j with positive imports on tariff line ' h . That is, the ad valorem equivalent of tariff line h is based on an aggregation defined below of the following: h in each of our 3 time periods in our base period, where there is a match with tariff lines at the eight digit level and positive imports for some non-CIS country j. In this case, k=8. If there is no match at the eight digit level, we go to six digits or in a some cases to four digits. Equation 7 defines how we calculate the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff based on ten-digit tariff line data on imports from country j in year t'.
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Tariff Rates for Unmatched Tariff Lines in 2011.
Employing equation 7, in the case of 2011, we calculate the tariff rate for tariff line hAM t from the following equation: We define the bias adjustment in the trade weighted average as: (12) Adjust ( If the simple average tariff is lower when averaged over the set AM t , we say the trade weighted average is biased down by averaging over this reduced set of tariff lines. We then adjust the unadjusted trade weighted average by the bias to obtain our estimate of the trade weighted average tariff that we report in table 1.
Bound Tariff Rates for the Years 2012-2020
For the years 2012-2020, we need to first calculate the -bound‖ or maximum states that the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff applied to tariff line h in year t depends on the country and year in the base period. We then aggregate over all years and countries in the base period to get the MFN tariff for product line h for the year 2011. This is calculated by: 
Economy-wide and Aggregated Sector Tariff averages for 2012-2020.
For 2012-2020, the bound tariff rates will progressively reduce the applied tariffs rates of the Russian Federation, but there are many tariff lines where the applied tariff rates in 2011 will be below even the final bound tariff commitments.
i.e., water in the tariff commitment schedule. For the years 2012-2020 therefore, we calculate the tariff of the Russian Federation as the minimum of the bound tariff and the applied tariff of 2011 according to the following formula: where Adjust(t) is defined analogously to Adjust (2011).
With the weighted average calculation the more important import categories receive higher weights. The problem with the weighted average approach is that very high tariffs discourage and may eliminate imports. Then the weight of these high tariffs will be zero. Although both approaches have their merits and problems, unless otherwise stated, our results are based on simple averages.
IV. Results for the Aggregate Average Tariff
Impact of the Customs Union (Average MFN Tariffs)
Our key results for the overall average tariff rates are summarized in table 1 below. The calculations in table 1 for 2010 are based on tariff rates in effect as of April 1, 2010. The common external tariff of the Customs Union went into effect (with limited exceptions mostly in Kazakhstan) on July 1, 2010. We infer that differences in tariffs between 2010 and 2011 are due to the Customs Union. On an unweighted average basis, tariffs increased slightly from 11.1 percent to 11.5 percent.
Impact of the WTO Commitments on applied average MFN tariffs
We assume that Russia accedes to the WTO in 2012 and implements the first 
Impact on Tariff Lines with Specific Tariffs
Going back to 2001, the Russian government has been progressively increasing the number of tariff lines with a specific tariff component. Table 1 
Impact of the WTO Commitments (Simple Average Bound Tariff)
The -bound‖ or maximum average un-weighted MFN tariff of Russia will be 8.6 percent after all commitments are implemented. Countries may apply tariffs at rates less than their -bound‖ maximum rates.
17 Assuming the applied tariffs are not increased, the average -bound‖ MFN tariff of Russia in 2020 will be higher than the average applied un-weighted MFN tariff of 7.9 percent.
We calculate that there are 1498 tariff lines where the current applied tariff of Russia is less than the final -bound‖ rate under the commitments of Russia to the WTO. 760 of the total tariff lines with applied MFN tariffs less than WTO bound tariff levels are in the machinery and mechanical appliances and electrical machinery and equipment categories (2-digit categories 84 and 85). Examples at the ten digit tariff line level where the value of imports is large are the following. Over $2 billion of imports were in three ten digit categories of auto parts. They entered with a zero import tariff in 2010 in the Customs Union, while the final bound rate at the WTO for these categories was either five or fifteen percent. 18 Over $1 billion in electricity turbo-generators (ten digit code 8502292000) entered in 2010 with a Customs Union tariff of zero, while the WTO bound rate is five percent. 17 The WTO (2011) Secretariat estimated that the un-weighted average bound tariffs of Russia will be 7.8 percent in 2020. Our estimates are slightly higher for two reasons. Due to data limitations, the WTO statistical office had to calculate the ad valorem equivalents of the specific tariffs at the eightdigit level, rather than at the -ten digit‖ tariff line level of the tariff schedule of the Russian Federation. We had the more detailed ten digit data available, which allows more accurate calculations. See WTO (2007) for more details on their methodology for calculating the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. Further, also due to data limitations, the WTO calculations ignored specific tariffs on a limited number of tariff lines where the specific tariffs and the import data were in different units, an omission which leads to a downward bias in the WTO estimates. This problem arises in the case of motor vehicles. We obtained concordance from using information in other parts of the tariff classification that allowed the concordance (as explained above). Thus we estimated the tariff equivalents of the specific tariffs for all ten digit tariff lines. 18 These categories are 8707101000 (auto bodies), 8708291000 (parts and accessories) and 8708402001 (gear boxes).
Implications for the Entry of Kazakhstan into the WTO
As has been shown by both Shepotylo (2011) and Jandosov and Sabyrova (2011), Kazakhstan had to significantly increase its MFN tariffs in order to implement the common external tariff of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union.
Importantly, Kazakhstan had already reportedly signed bilateral market access agreements with several WTO members during its accession negotiations in which it had committed to lower tariffs than the tariffs of the Customs Union. Since there is substantial water in the tariff of Russia's commitments, however, Russia should be able to agree to lower the bound tariffs of the Customs Union to pay -compensation‖ to the WTO members for Kazakhstan applying higher tariffs than its commitments, without actually having to lower any applied tariffs in Russia. 
Comparison of Average Tariffs with Other Countries
VI. Conclusions
We find that WTO commitments will progressively and significantly lower the applied tariffs of the Russian Federation. After all commitments are implemented, tariffs will fall from 11.5 percent to 7.9 percent on an un-weighted average basis and from 13.0 percent to about 5.8 percent on a weighted average basis. The average -bound‖ tariff rate of Russia will be higher than the applied tariffs--8.6 percent bound tariff on an un-weighted average basis. We calculate that there will be 1498 tariff lines with applied tariff rates less than the maximum or bound rates under the WTO commitments. Russia's commitments represent significant tariff liberalization, but compared with other countries that have acceded to the WTO, the commitments of the Russian Federation are not unusual, especially when compared to the Transition countries. Tables April 11, 2012   Table 1 Note: An applied MFN rate includes both ad valorem and specific components of the tariff. Specific component of the tariff is translated into the ad valorem equivalent according to the formula that is explained in the methodology section and using import statistics of Russia in 2006 -2010 . For 2011 -2020 , the ad valorem equivalent is computed using the 2009-2011 import data. 
